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Abstract 
This study investigates the role of financial access in moderating the effect of governance on 
insurance consumption in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries using data for the period 2004-
2014.Two life insurance indicators are used, notably: life insurance and non-life insurance. Six 
governance measurements are also used, namely: political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule of law. The empirical 
evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Least Squares Dummy 
Variable Corrected (LSDVC) estimators. Estimations from the LSDVC are not significant while 
the following main findings are established from the GMM. First, financial access promotes life 
insurance through channels of political stability, “voice & accountability”, government 
effectiveness, the rule of law and corruption-control. Second, financial access also stimulates non-
life insurance via governance mechanisms of political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, the rule of law and corruption-control. This research 
complements the sparse literature on insurance promotion in Africa by engaging the hitherto 
unexplored role of financial access through governance channels.  
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1. Introduction 
The insurance market is relevant for economic development because insurers provide leverage that 
can be used to hedge against negative macroeconomic shocks which substantially slow down 
economic activities. Hence, by offering financial protection to all segments of society involved in 
household and economic activities, uncertainty linked to the macroeconomic environment is 
reduced, and a favourable environment for doing business is provided because investors prefer 
macroeconomic environments that are less ambiguous (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018). Against 
this background on the importance of insurance in economic development, the positioning of this 
research on the role of financial access is moderating the effect of governance on insurance market 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is motivated by three main factors in scholarly 
literature and policy-making circles, namely: the relatively low consumption of insurance in the 
sub-region; the importance of financial access in development outcomes and gaps in the attendant 
literature.  These motivational factors are expanded in the following passages in the same 
chronology as they are highlighted.  
 First, in relation to other regions of the world that are more developed and associated with 
higher levels of insurance penetration, SSA is characterised by one of the lowest levels of 
insurance penetration in the world. As maintained by Kyerematen (2015), in the sub-region, with 
the exception of South Africa, only about 5% of the population subscribes to insurance services. 
Moreover, according to the narrative, a number of factors account for such low penetration of 
insurance in the sub-region, inter alia: the absence of infrastructure, poor doing business climate 
and low levels of financial access. This research, which is partly motivated by this strand, assesses 
the relevance of financial access is moderating the effect of governance on insurance penetration.  
 Second, financial development is fundamental in Africa’s recent economic growth 
resurgence essentially because, inter alia, access to finance improves investment opportunities for 
corporations and households as well as living standards and economic development.  The 
theoretical and empirical literature supporting this consensus include studies by Odhiambo (2010, 
2013, 2014); Wale and Makina (2017); Iyke and Odhiambo (2017); Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b), 
and Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon (2019). While financial development has also been 
recently documented to promote insurance penetration in Africa (Zerriaa, Amiri, Noubbigh & 
Naoui, 2017), the evidence is limited to a selected country (i.e. Tunisia) and a channel by which 
financial access influences insurance development is not engaged. This research focuses on a 
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sample of countries in SSA and engages the governance channel as a mechanism by which 
financial access affects insurance penetration. Hence, the research question this study seeks to 
answer is the following: how does financial access modulate the effect of governance on insurance 
penetration in SSA? The positioning of this research question is also motivated by an apparent gap 
in the literature. 
 Third, as expanded in section 2, contemporary research on the progress of the insurance 
market in Africa has fundamentally focused on two main branches of the literature, notably: (i) 
nexuses between economic growth and insurance consumption and (ii) drivers of insurance 
development. Some studies in the former branch of the literature are: Ioncică, Petrescu, Ioncica 
and Constantinescu (2012); Akinlo (2015); Alhassan and Biekpe (2015, 2016a); and Asongu and 
Odhiambo (2020). Moreover, researchers supporting the latter branch of literature include: 
Guerineau and Sawadogo, (2015); Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b); Zerriaa, Amiri, Noubbigh and 
Naoui (2017); and Asongu, Nnanna and Acha-anyi (2020). The second branch of the literature is 
closer to the positioning of this research. Furthermore, the departure of this research in the light of 
the attendant literature has been engaged in the previous paragraph.  Accordingly, in departing 
from Zerriaa et al. (2017), the use of the governance channel in this study is motivated by the 
documented relevance of  good governance in promoting a conducive environment for investment, 
economic prosperity and private sector development in Africa (Efobi, 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 
2016a, 2016b).  
 The remainder of the research is structured as follows: The intuition motivating the study 
and the highlighted insurance literature in the introduction are expanded in section 2, while the 
data and methodology are covered in section 3. The empirical results and the corresponding 
discussion are disclosed in section 4. Section 5 concludes with implications and future research 
directions.  
 
2. Intuition, theoretical insights and Insurance in Africa 
Two main sub-sections are covered in this section. The first engages the intuition and 
theory underpinning an investigation into linkages between financial access, governance and 
insurance development while the second expands the insurance-centric literature highlighted in 
the introduction.  
 
2.1 Intuition and theoretical insights  
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2.1.1 Intuition  
In the primary strand, authors of this study are fully aware of the risks associated with an 
empirical exercise that is not consolidated with established theoretical underpinnings. However, 
the authors also argue that applied economics is a useful scientific activity, essentially because 
applied econometrics is not exclusively designed for the acceptance and rejection of established 
theoretical underpinnings. Within this framework, it can reasonably be argued that applied 
economics that is consolidated by sound intuition is not a useless scientific endeavour. This is 
essentially because it could pave the way to theory-building. In a nutshell, the arguments above 
are supported by a recent strand of applied econometrics literature which maintains the usefulness 
of empirical exercises based on sound intuition (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra & 
Narayan, 2011). The following passages discuss the intuition underlying nexuses between 
financial access, governance and insurance penetration. 
Financial development is indispensable in building the insurance sector because insurance 
promotes economic prosperity, inter alia, by mobilising financial resources by means of insurance 
premia. Hence, the insurance sector also plays the role of financial intermediation within an 
economy because mobilized funds from the sector are ultimately invested in government securities 
and stock markets. Moreover, the mobilised funds are subsequently used to generate employment 
owing to their allocation to industrial development and productive investments. In summary, the 
insurance sector avails opportunities for the reduction of risks, growth of trade and consolidation 
of financial stability which are critical factors in the promotion of economic prosperity and 
sustainable economic development (Kumari, 2016). The role of the insurance sector in stabilising 
the economy and promoting macroeconomic certainty is not different from the role governance 
plays in promoting investment and economic development in a country. 
Good governance is necessary for sustainable development because dynamics of 
governance are associated with various advantages and disadvantages that can: (i) either increase 
or decrease avenues of risk mitigation and (ii) provide people and investors with a stable 
macroeconomic environment that reduces the negative ramifications of macroeconomic shocks on 
economic activities and household welfare.  In essence, the importance of good governance in 
putting in place appropriate policies that are favourable to the mobilisation and transformation of 
aggregate domestic capital into long term investment is consistent with the fundamental missions 
of the financial and insurance sectors. Hence: the intuitive connection between governance, 
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financial development and insurance development. The channel of governance as a mechanism by 
which financial access affects the development of the insurance sector can be better articulated by 
conceptually clarifying the good governance measurements. Hence, governance (political, 
economic and institutional) provides favourable avenues for the development of the insurance 
sector because policy makers in the governance sectors are motivated by the rewards of insurance 
penetration in economic prosperity.    
In the light of the above background, the conceptions and definitions of the underlying 
governance dynamics are in accordance with contemporary literature:  “The first concept is about 
the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice 
and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of government to 
formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no means least, regards the respect for 
citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Institutional 
Governance): the rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres, Asongu & Amavilah, 2015, p. 
1041). 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical insights  
Consistent with Iyawe and Osamwonyi (2017), there are well documented theoretical 
underpinnings linking economic activities and insurance sector development. Two of these are 
discussed in accordance with the authors, namely: (i) the Conventional Expected Utility Theory 
and (ii) the Cumulative Prospective Theory. According to the narrative, insurance is essential in 
developing countries such as Africa because of a plethora of associated development externalities.  
 
Conventional Expected Utility Theory (CEUT) 
From the simplest perspective, CEUT supposes that the utility of a consumer, U, is a function is 
disposable income, Y (Iyawe & Osamwonyi, 2017). From a health insurance perspective, a 
probability, p, exists that a consumer who can fall ill can allocate L expenditure to medical care. 
Otherwise, the consumer could also buy full insurance coverage pertaining to the actuarially fair 
premium of P = pL, for which a payoff transfer I will be received by the consumer, if he/she is ill. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that L=I. Hence, the expected utility without insurance is: 
)()()1( LYUYUpEU pu     (1) 
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With insurance, expected utility is: 
 
)()()()1( YPUIPYLUYPUpEU pi                                      (2) 
 
On the premise that there is a diminishing marginal income utility, the situation of the 
consumer is better if he/she avoids the risk of loss, L, by paying P for the insurance. It follows that 
the customer who is maximising expected-utility would buy insurance coverage for these 
underlying expenditure if EUi>EUu, or if 
 
)()()1()( LYUYUpPYU p                                      (3) 
 
In the light of the way the theory is mathematically specified, the choice between 
uncertainty and certainty of losses that are actuarially-equivalent is apparent. The choice pertaining 
to the purchase of insurance is linked with both a higher level of anticipated utility and certainty.  
Therefore, as documented by Nyman (2001), the demand for insurance is essentially motivated by 
the certainty associated with insurance subscriptions. Moreover, the underlying expected utility 
can be consolidated by factors that are favourable to insurance as those discussed in the intuition 
section of this study, inter alia: financial development and favourable governance and institutions.  
 
Cumulative Prospective Theory (CPT) 
The theory of choice which is also known as the prospect theory posits that from a particular point 
of reference, the value realised by individuals from income gains increases with gain in size, 
though at a diminishing rate (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1990, 1992). In the same vein, the value lost 
by individuals from income losses increases with the importance of loss at a decreasing rate.  
The CPT supposes that a risk-oriented behaviour on losses is displayed by investors who 
are willing toaccept risks in view of achieving their investment goals. Such behaviour has been 
established in a multitude of experimental studies (Iyawe & Osamwonyi, 2017). Accordingly, risk-
taking behaviour of managers of funds is associated with incentives of contracts (Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2017a). Moreover, Dass, Massa, and Patgiri (2008) have concluded that managers of 
funds characterised by high contractual incentives are associated with strategies that involve riskier 
investments. The nexuses between insurance consumption and conditions favourable to such 
insurance penetration (e.g. financial development and good governance as is in the context of this 
study) surrounding the CEUT are broadly consistent with the CPT.   
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2.2 Insurance sector development  
In the secondary strand, this research devotes space to expanding on the highlighted 
literature in the introduction, which has been documented in two main categories, notably: 
determinants of the development of the insurance market (Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; Alhassan 
& Biekpe, 2016b; Zerriaa et al., 2017) and linkages between insurance penetration and economic 
prosperity (Ioncică et al., 2012; Akinlo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 2016a).  These stands 
are developed in the same chronology as they are highlighted.  
In the category on determinants of insurance penetration, Guerineau and Sawadogo (2015) 
have examined twenty countries using data from 1996 to 2011. The authors have concluded using 
an endogeneity-robust empirical approach that a positive relationship between per capita income 
and the consumption of life insurance is apparent. Moreover, life insurance penetration is linked 
with young dependency ratio and life expectancy whereas factors that are positively associated 
with the phenomenon include: property rights, government stability and old dependency ratio. 
Zerriaa et al. (2017) have focused on the selected country (i.e. Tunisia) to investigate drivers of 
life insurance using data for the period 1990-2014 to conclude that rates of interest and inflation 
do not significantly promote the outcome variable. They also maintain that the consumption of life 
insurance is mitigated by pension expenditure while it is promoted by dependency, financial 
development, income, life expectancy and urbanisation. Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b) within this 
same category of the literature have assessed factors that stimulate life insurance in 31 African 
countries with data for the period 1996-2010.  The results of the study show that relative to 
financial factors, demographic drivers more significantly elicit the outcome variable. Furthermore, 
life insurance is not stimulated by inflation, dependency and life expectancy while positive impacts 
are induced from institutional quality, health expenditure, insurance consumption and financial 
development.    
In the second category of the insurance-centric literature, Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) 
investigate connections between efficiency, productivity and returns to scale economies in the non-
life insurance market of the most developed insurance sector in Africa (South Africa) using data 
for the period 2007-2012. Corresponding results show that about 20% of insurers carry-out their 
tasks with optimality whereas about 50% inefficiency is associated with non-life insurance 
operations. The related findings demonstrate that improvements in productivity are contingent on 
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technological ameliorations as well as non-monotonic effects from constant returns to scale and 
size. In another study, using data for the period 1990-2010, Alhassan and Biekpe (2016a) examine 
the nexuses between insurance penetration and economic development in selected African 
countries, namely:  Algeria, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South 
Africa. The results from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach show that long term 
connections between insurance penetration and economic growth are apparent in Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. As for the findings from the vector error correction 
model (VECM): Gabon shows mixed causality, Morocco reflects bi-directional causality while 
unidirectional causality is apparent in Madagascar and Algeria. Akinlo (2015) within this category 
of the literature has examined causal linkages between economic development and insurance in 33 
countries in SSA using data from 1995 to 2011.  The findings based on an estimation approach 
that controls for heterogeneity show evidence of bidirectional causality between insurance 
development and economic prosperity.   
Within this second category of the extant literature, there is also a substantial body of non-
African-centric literature that has focused on the nexus between insurance consumption and 
income levels. Hugues, Mota, Nunez, Sehgal and Ortega (2019) assess the impact of income and 
insurance on the probability of leg amputation to establish that across different types of insurance, 
there was a substantial reduction in odd rations linked to amputation.  Levere, Orzol,  Leininger 
and Early  (2019) are concerned with the long-term and contemporaneous impacts of the expansion 
of children’s public health insurance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation to 
conclude that: (i) enhanced eligibility to Medicaid decreases the participation on children’s SSI in 
states that are not characterised by automatic grants associated with SSI and (ii) in the long term, 
increased eligibility to Medicaid during childhood decrease the SSI participation of young adults 
to a certain degree.  
Finkelstein, Hendrenand Shepard (2019) investigate how much individuals with low income are 
willing to pay to obtained health insurance as well as the corresponding implications for the 
development of the insurance market. The authors estimate that even with generous subsidies, 
take-up will be substantially incomplete. Teusner, Brennan and Spencer (2015) have analysed 
nexuses between favourable dental visiting according to household income and the level of cover 
in private dental insurance. They conclude that whereas the height of cover was not linked to dental 
visiting, the results, however, showed that insurance could ameliorate orientation of and access to 
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dental care for adults in lower socioeconomic status and engender less effect on access patterns 
for adults with higher socioeconomic status.  Sackey and Amponsah (2017) examine if income 
levels matter in the willingness to accept capitation payment system within the framework of 
Ghana’s National Health Insurance Policy. The findings, inter alia: show that within an individual 
setting, the following are significant factors: high income, awareness, employment and smaller 
household size.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
This research focuses on 42 countries in SSA using data from 2004 to 20144. The motivation for 
the selection of sampled countries is contingent on constraints in the availability of data at the time 
of the study. The variables used in the empirical analysis are obtained from three main sources, 
namely: (i) World Governance Indicators of the World Bank for the governance variables (political 
stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-
control and the rule of law); (ii) the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the 
World Bank for the insurance dynamics (life insurance and non-life insurance) and  the financial 
access variable (private domestic credit); (iii) the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank for the control variables (mobile phone penetration and remittances).  
 The governance variables which have been conceptually clarified in section 2 are 
motivated by contemporary African governance literature (Andrés et al., 2015; Oluwatobi, Efobi, 
Olurinola, Alege, 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b) while the adopted insurance variables 
are also consistent  with the insurance-centric literature highlighted in the introduction and 
critically engaged in section 2 (Ioncică et al., 2012; Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; Akinlo, 2015; 
Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Zerriaa et al., 2017). Moreover, it is worthwhile to 
emphasise that this research uses all the insurance indicators provided by the FDSD of the World 
Bank.  The credit channel as a measurement of financial access is preferred to the deposit channel 
because credit availment is intuitively more associated with financial access, given that deposits 
                                                          
4The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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are only a measure of financial depth and can only promote access to finance when transformed 
into credit for economic operators.  
 The selection of variables in the conditioning information set (i.e. remittances and mobile 
phone penetration) is motivated by the discussed literature on determinants of insurance 
penetration. On the one hand, the burgeoning information technology is facilitating the expansion 
of the insurance market in Africa. On the other, remittances have been documented to be largely 
used for consumption purposes (including insurance consumption) by Ssozi and Asongu (2016). 
Hence the expected signs from the two control variables are positive. 
 It is also worthwhile to emphasise that only two control variables are adopted in the 
conditioning information set for the purpose of avoiding concerns pertaining to instrument 
proliferation that can considerably bias estimated coefficients owing to the invalidity of 
corresponding estimated models. In essence, the purpose of limiting control variables in order to 
ensure the validity of estimated models (even when instruments are collapsed in the estimation 
exercise) is consistent the attendant empirical literature based on the generalised method of 
moments (GMM).  An example of a study that has used two control variables is Bruno, De Bonis 
and Silvestrini (2012). Moreover, there are also GMM-centric studies in the literature that are 
based on no control variable, notably: Osabuohien and Efobi (2013). Appendix 1 provides the 
definitions and sources of variables while Appendix 1 discloses the summary statistics. The 
correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 GMM Specification 
Drawing on the narrative in the data section, the GMM empirical strategy is adopted for this study. 
The empirical approach is also based on four main justifications which are consistent with the 
relevant GMM-centric literature (Efobi, Tanaken & Asongu, 2018; Fosu & Abass, 2019). (i) In 
accordance with the attendant literature, an elementary condition for the employment of the 
estimation technique is that the number of cross sections should exceed the number of time periods 
within each cross section. Such is the case with the data structure of this research because the study 
is dealing with 42 countries with data spanning 11 years (i.e. 2004 to 2014) in each country. (ii) 
Persistence is reflected in the adopted insurance indicators because of apparent correlation 
coefficients (i.e. between level and first lags) that are higher than 0.800 which is the established 
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rule of thumb for confirming the presence of persistence in the literature (Meniago & Asongu, 
2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019).  Accordingly, the corresponding correlations are respectively, 0.975 
and 0.992 for non-life insurance and life insurance. (iii) Given that the data structure of the research 
is panel, it is obvious that cross-country variations are taken onboard in the estimation exercises. 
(iv) Issues pertaining to endogeneity are also considered and addressed on two main fronts. On the 
one hand, reverse causality or simultaneity is tackled with the use of internal instruments in the 
estimation process. On the other, the unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by controlling for 
time-invariant omitted variables.  
            In the light of available GMM options (i.e. difference versus system estimators) in the 
empirical literature, this research follows the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) improvement of Arellano 
and Bond (1995) which has been established in contemporary development literature to produce 
more efficient estimates and restrict the proliferation of instruments (Tchamyou et al., 2019). 
The following equations in level (4) and first difference (5) summarise the standard system 
GMM estimation procedure.  
tititititititititi RMCGGCII ,,6,5,4,3,2,10,                    
(4) 
 
)()()()(
)()()()(
,,,,6,,5
,,4,,3,,22,,1,,


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

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

tititttitititi
titititititititititi
RRMM
CGCGGGCCIIII
            
(5) 
 
where, tiI , reflects an insurance indicator (i.e. life insurance and non-life insurance) of country i in 
period t , 
0 is a constant. C is credit access of country i in  period t .   G is a governance dynamic 
(encompassing political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulation quality, government 
effectiveness, corruption-control and the rule of law) of  country i in  period t .CG reflects 
interactions between credit access  and governance indicators(“credit access” × “political 
stability”; “credit access” × “voice & accountability”; “credit access”× “regulation quality”; 
“credit access” × “government effectiveness”; “credit access” × “corruption control” and “credit 
access”× “the rule of law ”). M is mobile phone penetration of country i in  period t .  R denotes 
remittances of country i in  period t .  represents the lagged value  which is one within the 
framework of this study because a year lag is enough to capture past information, 
t is the time-
specific constant,
i  
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term
5.  
                                                          
5 The variables enter the GMM estimations in level, lag, orthogonal formats, inter alia, and transformation in the GMM is done 
automatically with the Roodman command during the estimation process. For instance the following is the first specification of 
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             The interaction term is used to capture the conditional impact or associated effect from 
financial access and governance. This is consistent with the problem statement of the study which 
is to assess the role of financial access in moderating the effect of governance on insurance 
consumption. Hence, the estimated interaction term captures the conditional role of financial 
access in moderating governance for insurance penetration. 
 
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
Still in accordance with contemporary GMM literature, clarifying concerns pertaining to 
identification and exclusion restrictions is particularly relevant for a robust GMM specification 
(Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b). Going by the literature, years are acknowledged as strictly 
exogenous whereas elements in the conditioning information set (i.e. control variables) and the 
independent variables of interest (i.e. governance and credit access variables) are acknowledged 
as predetermined or endogenous-explaining (Tchamyou et al., 2019).  This identification and 
exclusion restriction properties are consistent with Roodman (2009b) who has argued that the 
identified strictly exogenous variables (i.e. years) are not likely to be endogenous upon a first 
difference6.   
             The Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) is used to assess the assumption underlying the 
strategy of identification and corresponding exclusion restriction properties. Based on this 
criterion, the null hypothesis of the test should not be rejected in order for the identification process 
and exclusion restrictions assumptions to hold. This null hypothesis reflects the position that the 
identified strictly exogenous indicators affect insurance penetration exclusively via the 
predetermined variables. The procedure for validating exclusion restrictions is broadly consistent 
with the less contemporary instrumental variable (IV) approach in which a rejection of the null 
hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan/Hansen test, implies that the engaged instruments do not 
affect the outcome variables exclusively via the exogenous components of the identified 
predetermined variables (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2003). 
 
                                                          
Table 1: “xtabond2     inslife  l.inslife  pols  pcrdbof  polfin  mobilephone  remit   yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11, 
gmm(l.inslife l(0/1).pols  l(0/1).pcrdbof  l(0/1).polfin  l(0/1). mobilephone   l(0/1).remit, collapse lag(1 1)) iv(yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 
yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11, eq(diff)) twostep small orthog” where, xtabond2 is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) Stata command, inslife 
is life insurance, l.inlife is the lag of life insurance, pols is political stability, pcrdbof is private domestic credit, polfin is the 
interaction between political stability and private domestic credit, mobile is mobile phone penetration, remit is remittances, yr1 
yr2....yr11 denote year dummies, inter alia. 
6Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical findings are presented in this section in Tables 1-2. Table 1 presents results on 
linkages between governance, financial access and life insurance while Table 2 shows findings on 
nexuses between governance, financial access and non-life insurance.  In each table, there are six 
main specifications pertaining to each governance channel, namely: political stability, “voice & 
accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and corruption control 
(in this order). For all six specifications in both tables, four information criteria as employed to 
examine the validity of estimated models7.In the light of these criteria, all the estimated models 
are overwhelmingly valid.  
              In order to investigate the total influence of financial access on the relevance of good 
governance in promoting the consumption of life insurance and non-life insurance, net impacts are 
computed from the unconditional effect of government quality and the conditional effect from the 
interaction between government quality and financial access. This computation is consistent with 
contemporary literature based on interactive regressions (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b).  For the 
purpose of illustration and clarity, in the third column of Table 1, the net impact from the 
importance of financial access in modulating the effect of “voice & accountability” on life 
insurance is 0.031([-0.007 × 20.913] + [0.178]). In this calculation, the mean value of private 
domestic credit is 20.913; the unconditional impact of “voice & accountability” is 0.178 whereas 
the conditional impact from the interaction between private domestic credit and “voice & 
accountability” is -0.007.  
                As documented in Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and in contemporary interactive 
regressions literature (Tchamyou, 2019b; Agoba, Abor, Osei & Sa-Aadu., 2019), the constituents 
of the interactive regressions should not be interpreted in isolation, but net effects should be 
computed based interactive and unconditional effects. The interactive effect is the conditional 
effect multiplied by the mean value of the moderating variable whereas the unconditional effect is 
the effect of the main independent variable of interest (i.e. governance). In this study, we are 
                                                          
7 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because 
their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is 
not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the 
proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, 
a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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assessing the role of finance in modulating the effect of governance on insurance penetration. 
Hence, the unconditional effect should be associated with governance while the interactive effect 
is the conditional effect of governance multiplied by the mean value financial access or the 
moderating variable. 
            The following findings can be established from Tables 1-2. First, credit access promotes 
life insurance through channels of “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, the rule of 
law and corruption-control. This is essentially because net effects are apparent from the attendant 
specifications. Second, access to credit also stimulates non-life insurance via governance 
mechanisms of political stability, regulation quality, government effectiveness and corruption-
control. The significant control variables largely display the expected signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Governance, Financial Access and Life Insurance (GMM 1) 
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance (LifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
LifeI (-1) 0.953*** 0.858*** 0.781*** 0.938*** 0.868*** 0.758*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) -0.0001 0.005* 0.003 0.002 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.910) (0.083) (0.222) (0.221) (0.053) (0.541) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.039 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.164)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.178** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.014)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.264*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.173** --- --- 
    (0.025)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.192*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.165*** 
      (0.006) 
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Credit×PolS 0.00004 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.961)      
Credit× VA --- -0.007*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Credit× GE --- --- -0.004*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Credit× RQ --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- 
    (0.136)   
Credit× RL --- --- --- --- -0.003*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Credit× CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.006*** 
      (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.0001 -0.00003 0.0005 -0.001* 0.00008 0.001*** 
 (0.631) (0.952) (0.411) (0.099) (0.861) (0.006) 
Remittances 0.001 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.023*** 
 (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na 0.031 0.180 na 0.129 0.039 
       
AR(1) (0.086) (0.068) (0.076) (0.084) (0.078) (0.073) 
AR(2) (0.446) (0.438) (0.439) (0.455) (0.438) (0.409) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.003) (0.089) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.628) (0.310) (0.286) (0.338) (0.402) (0.422) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.066) (0.661) (0.229) (0.275) (0.381) (0.169) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.951) (0.209) (0.352) (0.384) (0.396) (0.590) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.193) (0.343) (0.394) (0.168) (0.286) (0.245) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.888) (0.318) (0.257) (0.553) (0.490) (0.565) 
       
Fisher  228120*** 35913.95*** 334766.51*** 18283.99*** 33379.63*** 29632.82*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  250 250 250 250 250 250 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913.na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in brackets are p-values.  
 
Table 2: Governance, Financial Access and Non-Life Insurance  (GMM 2) 
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance (NLifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
NLifeI (-1) 0.755*** 0.643*** 0.696*** 0.788*** 0.808*** 0.663*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.001 0.0002 0.0002 0.001* -0.0002 0.0005 
 (0.178) (0.800) (0.773) (0.055) (0.572) (0.416) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.117*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.175*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.004)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.137*** --- --- --- 
   (0.005)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.140*** --- --- 
    (0.006)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.137*** --- 
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     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.146*** 
      (0.002) 
Credit×PolS -0.002*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Credit× VA --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.100)     
Credit× GE --- --- -0.001** --- --- --- 
   (0.034)    
Credit× RQ --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Credit× RL --- --- --- --- -0.0007 --- 
     (0.172)  
Credit× CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.001* 
      (0.063) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006** -0.0003 
 (0.279) (0.295) (0.551) (0.135) (0.033) (0.385) 
Remittances 0.009*** 0.006 0.013* 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.012** 
 (0.000) (0.311) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.075 na 0.116 0.119 na 0.125 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.244) (0.146) (0.132) (0.145) (0.146) (0.137) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.263) (0.253) (0.133) (0.422) (0.301) (0.212) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.095) (0.229) (0.130) (0.280) (0.156) (0.120) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.487) (0.310) (0.218 (0.482) (0.445) (0.359) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.488) (0.102) (0.056) (0.090) (0.225) (0.136) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.190) (0.545) (0.427) (0.846) (0.414) (0.392) 
       
Fisher  711.86*** 2913.06*** 4198.79*** 9816.76*** 9694.06*** 10636.50*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Observations  270 270 270 270 270 270 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913.na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in brackets are p-values.  
 
 
It is worthwhile to articulate that the insignificance of political stability in the first column 
of Table 1 may be traceable to outliers, given that four observations from the dataset slightly 
exceed the maximum negative limit of -2.5. These outlier observations are Burundi in 2004 and 
2007 and Sudan in 2009 and 2011. However, after removing these outliers, the result of political 
stability remained insignificant.   
 
4.2 Robustness checks with a change in the conditioning information set  
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In this section, we assess whether the established findings in the previous section withstand 
empirical scrutiny by involving per capita income in the conditioning information set. The choice 
of this alternative control variable is consistent with the insurance literature documented in Section 
2 which maintains that there are significant correlations between income levels, economic growth 
and insurance penetration. Given that not more than two variables can be involved in the 
conditioning information set in order to curtail concerns pertaining to instrument proliferation that 
substantially bias estimated coefficients, the mobile phone penetration variable is replaced with 
the GDP per capita growth variable. The overall incidence of financial access in modulating 
governance dynamics for insurance development is assessed from net effects as in Tables 1-2. 
While Table 3 focuses on nexuses between governance, finance and life insurance penetration, 
Table 4 is concerned with linkages between governance, finance and non-life insurance 
penetration. It is apparent from Table 3 that financial access significantly modulates most 
governance dynamics from an overall positive incidence on life insurance, namely:  political 
stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness and the rule of law. From the 
findings in Table 4, the following governance mechanisms are modulated by financial access to 
induce a positive effect on life insurance, namely: political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
regulation quality and rule of law.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Governance, Finance and Life Insurance   (GMM 3) 
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance (LifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
LifeI (-1) 0.992*** 0.757*** 0.766*** 0.711*** 0.762*** 0.646*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.002* 0.011***  0.008*** 0.011** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.098) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.113*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.528*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.282*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.501*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.391*** --- 
     (0.000)  
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Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.345*** 
      (0.004) 
Credit × PolS -0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Credit × VA --- -0.017*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Credit × GE --- --- -0.005*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.005*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- -0.007*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.014*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth -0.003** -0.008** -0.0002 0.001 -0.003 -0.006*** 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.914) (0.673) (0.196) (0.005) 
Remittances 0.0007 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.034*** 
 (0.668) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.008 0.172 0.177 nsa 0.396 nsa 
       
AR(1) (0.163) (0.143) (0.168) (0.167) (0.173) (0.162) 
AR(2) (0.507) (0.583) (0.492) (0.482) (0.481) (0.424) 
Sargan OIR (0.002) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.435) (0.316) (0.189) (0.075) (0.103) (0.089) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.128) (0.247) (0.216) (0.101) (0.311) (0.137) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.667) (0.378) (0.236) (0.142) (0.098) (0.141) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.153) (0.708) (0.470) (0.252) (0.337) (0.340) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.725) (0.163) (0.129) (0.076) (0.085) (0.070) 
       
Fisher  25584.67*** 22950.72*** 16816.89*** 10384.24*** 5724.60*** 11122.30*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  252 252 252 252 252 252 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the estimated model is not valid.  
Constants are included in all regressions. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Values in brackets are p-values. 
 
Table 4: Governance, Finance and Non-Life Insurance (GMM 4) 
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance (NLifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
NLifeI (-1) 0.714*** 0.432*** 0.507*** 0.766*** 0.753*** 0.645*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.0006 0.001** 0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.572) (0.016) (0.390) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.128*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.449*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.343*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
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Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.331*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.160*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.245*** 
      (0.000) 
Credit × PolS -0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Credit × VA --- -0.010*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Credit × GE --- --- -0.004*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.003*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- -0.003*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.005*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth -0.001 -0.003 -0.0009 -0.002 0.0003 -0.001 
 (0.607) (0.262) (0.709) (0.338) (0.874) (0.469) 
Remittances 0.008*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.347) (0.004) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.044 0.239 nsa 0.268 0.097 nsa 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.212) (0.196) (0.080) (0.120) (0.150) (0.106) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.233) (0.171) (0.039) (0.114) (0.198) (0.084) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.135) (0.241) (0.116) (0.268) (0.436) (0.100) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.371) (0.199) (0.067) (0.120) (0.162) (0.161) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.260) (0.455) (0.098) (0.521) (0.061) (0.110) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.280) (0.117) (0.083) (0.060) (0.571) (0.174) 
       
Fisher  3185.46*** 98.81*** 4661.50*** 1787.19*** 4325.16*** 7335.08*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations  272 272 272 272 272 272 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the estimated model is not valid. 
Constants are included in all regressions. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Values in brackets are p-values. 
 
 
When the findings in Tables 1-4 are compared and contrasted, financial access significantly 
modulates governance dynamics to positively affect both life insurance and non-life insurance 
with one exception: only regulation quality is not significantly modulated by financial access to 
positively influence life insurance. The negative effect of GDP per capita in Table 3 can be 
traceable exclusive growth in Africa. Accordingly, despite the recent growth resurgence 
experienced by most countries in SSA, there are still growing levels of inequality which reflect the 
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fact that the fruits of economic growth have not been equitably distributed across the population 
(Tchamyou et al., 2019). Hence, growth in income levels is skewed in favour of the wealthy 
fractions of society.  
 
4.3 Robustness checks with an alternative estimation technique  
Consistent with Bogliacino, Pivaand Vivarelli (2012), the adopted GMM-estimation can poorly 
perform when a panel is characterised by a small number of cross sections. This research, 
therefore, employs an alternative estimation technique that can address the issues associated with 
small cross sections in dynamic panel regression based on unbalanced data, notably: the Least 
Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) estimator (Kiviet, 1995; Judson &Owen, 1999;  
Bun & Kiviet, 2001, 2003). 
 The LSDVC methodology is appropriate when outcome variables are persistent, as 
observed in the methodology section of this research on the one hand and on the other,  builds on 
recursive correction of the bias of the fixed effects estimator (Bogliacino et al., 2012). According, 
the LSDVC methodology has been extended to unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005a, 2005b) 
because the author has improved the original Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator 
to an LSDVC estimator. Accordingly, the LSDVC is appropriate for this research because the 
number of cross sections is not large and the dataset is unbalanced  
 
 
 
Table 5: Governance, Finance and Life Insurance   (LSDVC1) 
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance (LifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice 
&Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
       
LifeI (-1) 0.246*** 0.270*** 0.238*** 0.259*** 0.267*** 0.264*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) -0.030 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.656)      
Voice &Accountability (VA) --- 0.062 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.628)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.027 --- --- --- 
   (0.849)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.060 --- --- 
    (0.723)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- -0.090 --- 
     (0.537)  
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Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.113 
      (0.364) 
Credit × PolS 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.311)      
Credit × VA --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.395)     
Credit × GE --- --- 0.005* --- --- --- 
   (0.084)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.0002 --- --- 
    (0.908)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- 0.004 --- 
     (0.208)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.008*** 
      (0.008) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 
 (0.365) (0.409) (0.363) (0.336) (0.268) (0.623) 
Remittances -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.913) (0.704) (0.895) (0.784) (0.834) (0.449) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
Observations  211 211 211 211 211 211 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at least 
one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in brackets 
are p-values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Governance, Finance and Non-Life Insurance   (LSDVC 2) 
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance (NLifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
       
NLifeI (-1) 0.466*** 0.451*** 0.454*** 0.455*** 0.440*** 0.452*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.003* 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.086) (0.032) (0.095) (0.100) (0.139) (0.104) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.030 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.379)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.081 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.198)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- -0.004 --- --- --- 
   (0.953)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.090 --- --- 
    (0.270)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
     (0.627)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- -0.0005 
      (0.993) 
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Credit × PolS -0.002** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.018)      
Credit × VA --- -0.004** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.014)     
Credit × GE --- --- -0.003** --- --- --- 
   (0.045)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.002* --- --- 
    (0.060)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- -0.003 --- 
     (0.037)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.003** 
      (0.037) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.446) (0.689) (0.460) (0.477) (0.559) (0.740) 
Remittances 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.008** 
 (0.046) (0.029) (0.020) (0.013) (0.025) (0.034) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
Observations  230 230 230 230 230 230 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at least 
one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in brackets 
are p-values. 
 
Unfortunately, as apparent in the findings of Tables 5-6, within the LSDVC framework, 
significant net effects are not apparent even when: (i) GDP per capita growth and remittances are 
considered as control variables such as in Tables 3-4 and (ii) mobile phone penetration; GDP per 
capita growth and remittances are involved in the conditioning information set.    
 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 This study has investigated the role of access to credit in moderating the effect of good 
governance on insurance consumption in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries using data for the 
period 2004-2014. Two life insurance indicators are used, notably: life insurance and non-life 
insurance. All six governance dynamics from World Governance Indicators of the World Bank are 
also used, namely:  political governance (i.e. political stability and “voice &accountability”), 
economic governance (i.e. government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional 
governance (i.e. corruption-control and the rule of law). The empirical evidence is based on the 
Generalised Method of Moments. The following main findings are established. The empirical 
evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Least Squares Dummy 
Variable Corrected (LSDVC) estimators. 
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Estimations from the LSDVC are not significant while the following main findings are 
established from the GMM. First, financial access promotes life insurance through channels of 
political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, the rule of law and 
corruption-control. Second, financial access also stimulates non-life insurance via governance 
mechanisms of political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, the rule of law and corruption-control.   
The findings broadly show that policies should be designed with the understanding that 
increasing insurance consumption is an additional benefit from improving governance standards 
and access to finance. Hence, the main policy implication is that governments of sampled countries 
should continue to implement measures that are designed to improve both governance standards 
and access to finance given that increasing insurance consumption is an associated benefit from 
enhancing standards of governance and financial access. This is essentially because financial 
access promotes the insurance industry when: (i) the election and replacement of political leaders 
is  smooth and accompanied with stability, non-violence and accountability (representing political 
governance); (ii) conducive policies are formulated and implemented for the delivery of public 
commodities and private sector development which includes the insurance sector (denoting 
economic governance) and (iii) the State and citizens respect institutions that govern interactions 
between them, which affect the doing business environment (reflecting institutional governance).  
After comparing the magnitude of net effects across specifications: (i) financial access can 
more effectively modulate governance to positively affect life insurance through the mechanisms 
of government effectiveness and the rule of law and (ii) financial access can most (least) effectively 
moderate governance to induce positive effects on non-life insurance via regulation quality 
(political stability). On the one hand, the relevance of government effectiveness and rule of law 
show how economic governance and institutional governance are fundamental in promoting life 
insurance in Africa. On the other hand, while the comparative importance of economic governance 
is further confirmed for the promotion of non-life insurance (i.e. in the perspective of regulation 
quality), the fact that political stability is the least effective channel is intuitive and logical. 
Accordingly, in the absence of violence and political instability, incentives for insurance 
subscription may decrease because of a promising political and socio-economic outlook.   
Future studies can be devoted to assessing whether the established findings withstand 
empirical scrutiny from country-specific frameworks. Such idiosyncratic frameworks are relevant 
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for more targeted policy implications. Moreover, given that the conception of governance in this 
study is based on aggregated macroeconomic observations, it will also be worthwhile to extend 
the analysis with an assessment of how corporate governance practices affect the insurance 
industry of sampled countries. Another caveat of the study is that the findings can be situated 
between correlations and causality. Hence, as more data become available, it would be worthwhile 
for future studies to employ alternative estimation techniques from which findings that are 
assimilated to causality can be established.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
Life Insurance  LifeIns Life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Non-Life Insurance  NonLifeIns Non-life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Financial  Credit Credit   Privates Domestic Credits (% of GDP) FDSD 
    
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media” 
 
WGI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
 
 
WGI 
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implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
    
 
Regulation Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Corruption-Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile  Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per capita growth (% of annual) WDI 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank. WGI: World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Life Insurance  0.798 1.978 0.0006 12.220 405 
Non-Life Insurance  0.799 0.531 0.005 2.774 428 
Private Domestic Credit  20.913 24.628 0.873 150.209 440 
Political Stability  -0.490 0.867 -2.687 1.182 528 
Voice & Accountability -0.509 0.683 -1.780 0.970 462 
Government Effectiveness -0.711 0.599 -1.867 1.035 462 
Regulation Quality -0.608 0.529 -1.879 1.123 462 
Corruption-Control -0.577 0.590 -1.513 1.139 462 
Rule of Law -0.651 0.604 -1.816 1.007 462 
Mobile Phone Penetration 48.455 38.082 0.209 171.375 524 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
GDP per capita growth  2.680 4.243 -37.925 30.342 462 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniformsample size: 285) 
             
Credit PolS VA GE RQ CC RL Mobile Remit GDPpcg LifeIns NonLifeIns  
1.000 0.242 0.302 0.136 0.219 0.197 0.239 0.190 -0.071 0.165 0.853 0.772 Credit 
 1.000 0.754 0.660 0.584 0.747 0.763 0.268 0.034 0.092 0.227 0.323 PolS 
  1.000 0.836 0.789 0.806 0.855 0.391 0.086 0.109 0.207 0.293 VA 
   1.000 0.878 0.872 0.907 0.460 -0.031 0.141 0.106 0.190 GE 
    1.000 0.769 0.836 0.446 -0.088 0.041 0.165 0.250 RQ 
     1.000 0.910 0.413 0.107 0.099 0.159 0.273 CC 
      1.000 0.404 0.045 0.120 0.166 0.289 RL 
       1.000 -0.075 -0.025 0.131 0.070 Mobile 
        1.000 -0.012 -0.001 0.412 Remit 
         1.000 0.160 0.179 GDPpcg 
          1.000 0.790 LifeIns 
           1.000 NonLifeIns 
             
Mobile: Mobile phone penetration. Internet: Internet penetration. BroadB: Fixed  broadband subscriptions. PolS: Political Stability. 
VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. 
Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration. Remit: Remittances. GDPcpg: Gross Domestic Product per capita growth. LifeIns: Life 
Insurance. NonLifeIns: Non-Life Insurance.  
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